Fact Check: Roman cavalry reform

In the school where I do my day job, the assembly hall is dominated by a large painting entitled The Thin Red Line. It depicts Sir Colin Campbell’s 93rd Highlanders receiving the charge of the Russian cavalry at Balaclava in 1854.

Apparently, the highlanders had not been trained to deploy into the textbook square formation, so they stood two-deep and fired at the approaching enemy. The cavalry veered off, rather than engaging them.

It is a commonplace that cavalry will not attack a formed line of infantry. There seem to be two reasons. First, the cavalrymen themselves are unwilling to enter a killing zone, the area in which (in nineteenth-century warfare) they might be peppered with shot or (in ancient times) deluged with arrows and sling bullets. But second, horses are naturally averse to crashing into solid barriers, so that, faced with an unflinching line of infantry, they will normally attempt to go around it. Only the fortuitous breaking of the infantry line would give the cavalry an avenue through the barrier, rather than around it.

Of course, the Roman consul Arrian, governing the armed province of Cappadocia in the mid-AD 130s, was well aware of the characteristics of cavalry warfare. Faced with the threat of invasion by the horsemen of the Alans, Arrian drew up a battle plan whereby their approach would be halted by a solid block of infantry, bristling with spearheads. Just the sort of obstacle that cavalry would normally avoid. All of this is explained in my recent edition and translation of Arrian’s Ektaxis.

A barrage of missiles was planned to dissuade any of the Alans from loitering in the killing zone, while measures were put in place to tackle the horsemen as they inevitably veered off. The main point is that a completely cavalry army could be handled, if not easily, then certainly straightforwardly. Cavalry on its own had very limited utility.

Nevertheless, there is a widespread belief, ingrained from generations of repetition, that — sometime in the late AD 250s or early 260s — the emperor Gallienus developed a solely cavalry army, which the German scholar Robert Grosse dubbed the “battle cavalry”.

Gallienus’ cavalry commanders?

In a recent discussion of my Phantom Horsemen, the book in which I question the very existence of Gallienus’ cavalry army, reviewer Byron Waldron objects on the grounds that “it seems to me that Gallienus did make changes to the cavalry”.

So how might we expect these “changes” to manifest themselves? Surely Dr Waldron has more than a gut feeling to justify planting the seed of doubt in readers’ minds. Surely he won’t simply restate “facts” that I already dealt with in the book. Surely?

Chiefly, Dr Waldron claims that “various cavalry commanders in this period eventually became emperors or usurpers”, by which he means four individuals, none of whom is ever called “commander of the cavalry army” or “commander of the battle cavalry”. But each individual’s link to cavalry, however tenuous, is reinterpreted in a subjective way in order to fit the theory of the (unproven) “battle cavalry”. Here are the four men.

1) Aureolus

When the Byzantine historian Zosimus introduces Aureolus in his description of the events surrounding Gallienus’ death at Milan in AD 268, he describes him as “commander of all the cavalry”. In this regard, we should remember the pertinent observation made by Matthias Springer in his 1988 paper, that the phrase “commander of all the cavalry” is essentially meaningless. (“Only a preconceived opinion”, wrote Springer, “can infer the existence of a special battle cavalry from that phrase”.) After all, it was the emperor himself who commanded all the cavalry, and he did so through the agency of his equestrian officers.

However, the phrase makes perfect sense in the context of a battle, where the cavalry forces might be entrusted to an overall commander, such as the one Septimius Severus explicitly appointed at the Battle of Lugdunum (as I explain in the book). Aureolus, we know, had commanded the cavalry at Mursa against the usurper Ingenuus, because Zonaras tells us so.

Dr Waldron complains that, at the Battle of Mursa (which probably occurred in AD 260), “Zonaras does not speak of ‘all the cavalry’ (Gallienus led the Mauri)”, which is perfectly true. In fact, Zonaras tells us that “commanding the cavalry, Aureolus, by fighting nobly with his horsemen, destroyed many of those who sided with Ingenuus, and turned the remainder to flight”. I think most of Zonaras’ readers would realize that he must have been directing all the cavalry forces present in the battle with the exception of those accompanying the emperor.

Eight years later, Aureolus had moved on with his career, but his claim to fame was having commanded the cavalry and won the day for his emperor at Mursa, the first battle against a usurper. Let us not lose sight of this important fact, which is often forgotten in the headlong rush to try and “prove” the existence of Robert Grosse’s “battle cavalry”.

2) Aurelian

Zonaras records that the future emperor Aurelian “came to (Gallienus) with horsemen” in the struggle against Aureolus in AD 268. (I wondered, in my book, whether this might have been Gallienus’ horse guard, but the phrase is too vague to press the point.) The only other testimony comes from the rather unreliable “Life of the deified Aurelian” in the Augustan History, which claims that “before he took power, Aurelian commanded all the cavalry under Claudius”. (Here is this meaningless phrase “all the cavalry” again, and I wonder whether this, too, might have been a battlefield command.)

3) Claudius II

Dr Waldron reminds us that “Claudius was said to have been a cavalry commander at some point”. This is Zonaras, who quotes a secondhand story referring to him, at some point prior to becoming emperor, as “Claudius the cavalry commander”. It is worth remembering that commanding a unit of cavalry was a standard stage in the career of any aspiring equestrian officer.

Dr Waldron is (naturally) not alone in creating this spurious link between cavalry — any cavalry — and the fictitious “battle cavalry”. For example, Professor Lukas de Blois, who has championed Gallienus’ cavalry army for fifty years, describes Claudius II (in his 2019 book) as “Gallienus’ cavalry commander” and “the commander of Gallienus’ new army”. He wasn’t.

4) Probus

Dr Waldron also highlights the fact that the future emperor Probus “according to the Epitome de Caesaribus was named Equitius”, which might link him to the “battle cavalry”. Like the previous three individuals, Probus was already discussed and dismissed in my book, but perhaps Dr Waldron overlooked that passage.

Equitius, we should note, is not an unknown Roman nomen, so — giving the Epitome the benefit of the doubt — it may well have been Probus’ own name before he took the official nomenclature of Marcus Aurelius Probus.

Incidentally, it is quite unlikely that Aurelius Victor (the ultimate source of the Epitome), writing almost a century after the reign of Probus, was aware of the curious coins (discussed in my book) that each carry one of the letters A, E, Q, V, I, and T; and equally unlikely that he drew the same conclusion as Alfred von Domaszewski, that this was a coded reference to “Equitius” as the emperor’s name.

In any case, it’s a peculiar argument that concludes, from a horse-related knickname found on only one occasion (equus means “horse”, so Equitius ought to mean “pertaining to horses”, so the argument goes), that Probus must have been not only a cavalry commander, but specifically in command of the alleged “battle cavalry”.

5) Diocletian?

Lastly, Dr Waldron throws in a fifth individual: “It may be relevant that Diocletian was a Dalmatian career soldier”. I simply cannot imagine how this is supposed to bolster a case for the existence of a “battle cavalry”, so I’ll leave that one.

Cavalry coins indicating a reform?

But finally on this theme, Dr Waldron supports his belief in Gallienus’ cavalry reform by observing that “numismatic legends and iconography attest to periods in the late third century when cavalry was especially important”. Forgive me my deep scepticism as we explore what he means.

It’s one of these arguments that begins innocently enough. Third-century emperors are depicted on horseback, we are told. Where? On the Arch of Galerius in Thessaloniki. But wait ... that’s not third-century. That’s Tetrarchic.

Here is the reverse of a coin of Galerius, depicting that fourth-century emperor on horseback trampling his enemies. It wasn’t a new motif. Septimius Severus had used it, a century earlier. Severus Alexander, Decius, and Gallienus, too.

But many emperors appear on their coinage riding a horse when the theme is the emperor’s ADVENTVS (“arrival” in Rome). Hadrian used the same motif on his ADVENTVS coins. Likewise, Gordian III, Philippus, Decius, Trebonianus, Claudius, Aurelian, Probus, and Carus (amongst third-century emperors).

When Septimius Severus appeared as a galloping horseman, the theme was obviously the emperor’s VIRTVS (“manly courage”). Nobody would have suggested that it was an indication that the emperor had made some kind of change to the cavalry.

So let’s try and rein in some of these wild unsupported allegations of “changes to the cavalry” under Gallienus.

A history of the third century for the unwary

I have been reading Rome in the Third Century by Michael Sage, an emeritus professor of Classics. Reading, but not enjoying. Or agreeing.

I am unsure of Professor Sage’s precise specialism. His “Expert Profile” on the University of Cincinnati website informs us that he is “engaged on a source book on Roman warfare”, but that book appeared seventeen years ago in 2008. (Who knows, maybe there’s another one on the way.)

He holds a PhD, which (I imagine) concerned the third-century St Cyprian, since this was the subject of his first monograph, charmingly produced on a typewriter and published in 1975. Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, was famously martyred in AD 258, during the joint reign of the emperors Valerian and Gallienus. This, I assume, is the basis of the professor’s interest in the third century.

At any rate, Rome in the Third Century seems to have managed to avoid any editing process. Misprints may be due to inaccuracies in my eBook version. But there is much repetition of irrelevant material (irrelevant to the third century, that is) and the narrative is often confusing.

I’ve drawn some examples from the years AD 253–268, having just published my own book on this period.

Valerian and Gallienus

In a single paragraph, we read that “Valerian was in Germany during 256–257”, while “the Goths, along with the Borani, (...) in 254 or 255” raided Asia Minor, and “in 266 the Goths and Borani launched their most devastating raid (and) in 267 they even penetrated into Greece”, while “unlike his father, Gallienus remained in the west dealing with the German tribes”. The to-and-fro timescale here is very confusing.

We then jump back to AD 253 for Shapur’s invasion of Syria, but “by the next year, the Romans had re-established themselves in Antioch” under Valerian (pictured here), while Gallienus “was active on the Danubian front”, but “the quiet was broken by the emergence of a new threat along the Rhine frontier” — this was the emergence of the Franks “in 233 or a little later” and the Alamanni “in 213”. Remember these dates, because we then read that “Gallienus probably moved to the Rhine frontier in response to these developments in late 255 or 256” — so, his response came at least twenty years later? That’s confusing.

Then, “Valerian was with Gallienus at Cologne in 257” (fair enough, we read earlier — see above — that he was in Germany in that year) but “he was soon drawn away to the east” (okay, that ties in — a little confusingly — with the above text about him being in Syria), so “in 257 or 258 he installed his elder son Valerian at Viminacium” on the Danube.

Let’s read that again. The emperor Valerian installed his elder son Valerian at Viminacium? No, Valerian Caesar (pictured here) was Gallienus’ elder son (thus, Valerian’s grandson) about whom nothing is known beyond his name. (That name appears briefly on the coinage during AD 257 and disappears in AD 258.)

Meanwhile, Valerian went to Rome in AD 257 and “(Gallienus’) campaign in Gaul was interrupted by the proclamation of Ingenuus by his troops as emperor” on the Danube, and “it seems likely that Valerian the younger perished in the course of the revolt” (that’s not at all likely, given that we know nothing about Valerian junior), but “Gallienus’ commander Aureolus fought a decisive battle with Ingenuus at Mursa” (it was actually Gallienus himself — pictured here — who fought and won the battle; Aureolus only commanded the cavalry).

Nevertheless, “the failed rebellion was followed by another in 259” by Regalianus “governor of Illyricum” (note that there was no Roman province of Illyricum) who died under mysterious circumstances: “some claim that he was killed in battle against the Roxolani, while others state that he was assassinated by his own troops” (in fact, the Augustan History — the only source to mention it — claims both when it records that “he was killed at the instigation of the Roxolani and with the consent of the soldiers and the provincials”).

In the meantime, Gallienus’ absence from the Rhine prompted “multiple attacks along the frontier”, which were only finally “stopped by a governor of Raetia” (for this fascinating episode, passed over in half-a-dozen words here, see pages 56–59 of my book), but in the process, Gallienus’ younger son Saloninus (pictured here) was murdered by Postumus, the governor of Lower Germany, who promptly set up his breakaway Gallic Empire. “Finally, in early summer 260, Gallienus was able to extricate himself from the Danube frontier”, in order to defeat another band of Alamanni at Milan (actually probably the same Alamanni as were mentioned earlier).

East and West

“Meanwhile, during the spring of 258 Valerian returned to the east by way of Illyricum where the situation had become close to disastrous”. Professor Sage’s narrative has become so convoluted that we must take a moment (a) to remember where on earth Valerian had been (both emperors had perhaps spent AD 257 on the Danube front), and (b) to consider why Illyricum was a disaster zone (this must be harking back to Ingenuus’ revolt). When Valerian arrived in the east, “the campaign was abandoned before it could begin” because “the army was infected by the plague”, causing the “further weakening of an army that had already seen combat in Illyricum”. But wait. If this is just AD 258, whom had they been fighting in Illyricum?

In fact, Professor Sage’s chronology is extremely speculative. I, for one, do not agree with his version of events involving Ingenuus, Regalianus, and Postumus. At any rate, he proceeds to recount Valerian’s defeat and capture in 260, followed by the revolt of Macrianus and its defeat by Aureolus (“the general who had earlier defeated Ingenuus”), and the transfer of control in the east to “Odenathus (who) now launched two attacks on the Persians, the first in 262–3 and the second in 267”.

We are then swept back in time again: “there were invasions by the Goths in 262, 266 and the most serious in 267/8”. Then “Gallienus launched an attack against Postumus in 261, but it failed”. His tenth anniversary celebration in AD 262 “must have been a happy occasion as he had finally established general peace in the provinces that he controlled”. But wait. Didn’t we just read that the Goths were invading?

By this stage in the narrative, it only remains to document the revolt of “Marcus Aelius Aureolus”, a novel concoction of names for the man whom history knows only as “Aureolus” (as I explain in my book, he is often mistakenly named Manius Acilius Aureolus, for historic reasons dating back to the seventeenth century), and the murder of Gallienus, who — we are told — “had remained on the throne for eighteen years”. But there were only fifteen years from his father’s accession in September AD 253 until his own death in autumn AD 268.

Military reforms?

Inevitably, we read that “Gallienus introduced or developed a number of reforms that were vital to the empire’s survival”, and that “his reforms were primarily directed towards creating a more powerful military and a more effective administration to support it”. Unfortunately, this common belief has no basis in fact (as I argue in my book).

“The most striking change was the growing importance of cavalry”. This is a curious claim. How does Professor Sage define “importance”? I have shown in my book that there was no increase in cavalry numbers, and there is no sign of cavalry-only task forces being employed.

Bizarrely, he cites a statement made by Brian Campbell in 2005: “A further development was the creation of milliary units, which consisted of between 800 and 1,000 men”. But this development occurred in the later first century, a hundred and fifty years before Gallienus. And, as far as cavalry was concerned, when the ala II Septimia Syrorum miliaria appeared under Septimius Severus in north Africa, that took the total of “double-strength” squadrons to nine, distributed all around the frontiers. Yes, nine.

Professor Sage adds that “there was also some innovation in cavalry equipment beginning under the Emperor Hadrian who introduced mailed cavalry”. (But what were they wearing before this time, if not mail? In fact, he seems to have misunderstood the significance of the term catafracta — “fully armoured” — in the name of the ala Gallorum et Pannoniorum catafracta, a squadron whose earliest appearance is during the reign of Hadrian.)

“These changes”, he writes — the gradual creation of a handful of double-strength cavalry squadrons and a single fully-armoured squadron — “culminated in the third century (when) the key development was of a large, independent cavalry army in the reign of Gallienus”. So this is the basis of the “number of vital reforms” that he alleges.

His only doubt is whether Gallienus deliberately created the cavalry army, or whether “it simply emerged from existing trends” (what existing trends?). He decides that “it was probably the result of both factors”. So it was deliberate ... and also not deliberate. And if this level of argumentation is not astounding enough, the professor goes on to claim that “it was the beginning of a major change in the way Rome used its armies. It led to the separation of the army into two types of forces, a field army and a border or frontier army”. Oh, dear.

Recommended?

Professor Sage doesn’t provide an epilogue, a summing up, or any kind of final thoughts. The book simply seems to peter out. There is quite a bit of padding, as he takes each subject back to the days of the Roman Republic. For example, “the Roman army had developed from a militia that was raised for individual campaigns and commanded by senators who were not military specialists”. This extreme level of scene-setting is unnecessary in a book purporting to be about the third century.

The frequency of vague claims also generates an uncomfortable feeling that the reader is not in safe hands. “The army has been criticized by some scholars for lacking in innovation before the third century” (unfortunately, none of these scholars is named) “but there were some adjustments in tactics and weaponry”. He cites Arrian’s Ektaxis (sending the reader in search of a 1979 paper on “The legion as phalanx”, which is not the surest guide to this work) as proof that “the auxilia with its diverse arm and equipment was a weapon of increasing importance”. I find this conclusion baffling. But he also likens the Roman army to a wall, “but in the course of the third century this wall had to be rebuilt”.

Well, if we’re relying on the existence of a fully-armoured Hadrianic cavalry squadron and Gallienus’ imaginary mobile cavalry army, I’m afraid it will need to remain unbuilt. Verdict: not recommended.

... and he builds a privy

The eighteenth-century merchant Jonas Hanway, who achieved notoriety as an anti-tea-drinker, briefly travelled in Afsharid Persia and published his observations as An Historical Account of the British Trade over the Caspian Sea in 1753.

In Volume 2, subtitled The History of the Celebrated Usurper Nadir Kouli, he described Nadir Shah’s recapture of Isfahan from its Afghan occupiers in 1729, during which a most peculiar event occurred.

The inhabitants, keen to expunge all traces of the Afghans from their town, directed their wrath towards the mausoleum of Mahmoud al-Afghani.

“Having obtained the permission of the Shah for this purpose, they levell’d this edifice to the ground, with the fury of an enraged mob; they would not even suffer the repose of his bones; and, to add yet a greater mark of contempt and abhorrence, in the very place on which this mausoleum had been erected, they built a public jakes” (i.e. a latrine).

History repeats itself

Perhaps the Isfahanians knew their Old Testament. Certainly, on reading this curious story, I was reminded of King Jehu’s treatment of Ahab’s family and the prophets of Baal (2 Kings 10:1–28). At verse 27, καὶ κατέσπασαν τὰς στήλας τοῦ Βάαλ καὶ ἔταξαν αὐτὸν εἰς λυτρῶνα ἕως τῆς ἡμέρας ταύτης, or in the sonorous King James Version, “they brake down the house of Baal, and made it a draught house unto this day” (draught-house being a euphemism for latrine).

It is interesting that the tenth-century Byzantine chronicler Symeon Logothetes, in his abbreviated account of biblical history, chose to highlight this particularly colourful event: “Then, gathering all the prophets of Baal and the priests and the people, by pretending to order a public sacrifice, (Jehu) slays them all at once and he destroys the sanctuary of the idol and he makes it a latrine” (Chronicon 44:10).

Confusion and battle cavalry

I was reminded of all these interconnections this week, on reading a remark made by Australian classicist Byron Waldron, a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Cyprus, in his review of my book Phantom Horsemen (in which I question the existence of Gallienus’ battle cavalry).

Briefly stated, the evidence — such as it is — for the emperor Gallienus’ battle cavalry, beloved of generations of writers on third-century history, is a sentence written by the above-mentioned Byzantine chronicler Symeon Logothetes in his Chronicon.

A century and a half later, George Cedrenus then lifted it for his own Compendium of Histories, which is where twentieth-century scholars found it. I have told the whole story in Chapter 2 of my book.

Cedrenus, it should be explained, followed the example of Symeon (and his other tenth-century source, George Monachus) in presenting — when his world chronicle got to the period of the Roman empire — one or two salient facts about each emperor’s reign, especially if they involved church-related events.

For example, in the paragraph on the emperor Severus Alexander, he records that Alexander’s mother Mamaea “happened to be a Christian, and she summoned Origen, who resided in Antioch, as she wished to be taught the mystery of Christ”. Cedrenus lifted this almost verbatim from Symeon’s Chronicon.

For the emperor Gallienus, the chosen “fact” — tellingly characterized as “Cedrenus’ confused remark” by the earliest modern writer to cite it — was that “he first appointed units of cavalry, for in general the soldiers of the Romans were infantry”. This is patent nonsense. As I explain in my book, neither Symeon nor Cedrenus is a particularly trustworthy source for Roman imperial history. They periodically make some very odd allegations. (I gave some examples in my book, to which we might add the “bread falling from heaven” during the reign of Probus.) My own instinct is to reject “Cedrenus’ confused remark” as either corrupt or mistaken, or both.

Choosing the right verb

However, I threw out the possibility — an intriguing one, I thought — that Symeon (or his unknown source) may have misconstrued a remark that originally referred not to “units of cavalry” (ἱππικά τάγματα), but to Rome’s “equestrian order” (ἱππικόν τάγμα), that wealthy class of citizens who stood second only to the senators in terms of prestige. I have explained my reasoning in the book. In short, there was a belief, current in the centuries after Gallienus’ death, that he had been responsible for removing senators from legionary commands and appointing equestrians in their place.

I deliberately translated the Greek verb καθίστημι (kathistêmi) in the above-quoted remark using the rather awkward “appointed” (as I explained in my book) because I found it an odd choice of word to convey the meaning that modern researchers wish to give it — namely, that Gallienus “created” a new style of military unit.

The verb, in my opinion, usually implies “appointing” someone to a role or “posting” someone somewhere. To be sure, it can also (when suitably qualified) indicate “imposing” or “rendering” or “bringing about” a particular state of affairs.

Choosing the right translation

When we consider other ancient Greek writers, Josephus consistently uses this verb for appointing people to particular positions or tasks. For example, in his description of King Solomon’s army, he writes that David “appointed as commander of each division a man whom he knew to be brave and just” (Jewish Antiquities 7.369; many other examples at 4.165, 7.232, 8.318, 9.4, 9.188, 10.97, 10.182, 10.249, 12.254, 13.146, 15.322, 18.95, 18.237, 20.247 and 248). Xenophon uses it in this way, too (e.g. Hellenica 3.4.29, 7.1.45).

As for the meaning of posting existing troops, Xenophon uses the verb in this way, for example, when he writes that the Spartan Pharnabazos “armed the sailors and posted them as guardians of his own coastal territory” (Hellenica 1.1.24; other examples at 6.2.33 and Cyropaedia 5.3.1, 7.5.69, 8.6.17). Josephus often uses the verb in this sense, as well (e.g. Jewish Antiquities 8.181, 9.287, 13.157, 13.227, 15.184 and 185).

And it can imply the arranging of existing troops, as when Xenophon describes how the Spartan Clearchus “arranged the army so that it presented a fine appearance from every side as a compact phalanx” (Anabasis 2.3.3). But I cannot find an instance where it means creating troops or raising troops, in the manner required by “Cedrenus’ confused remark”.

Rendering a privy

Of course, it is always important to consider how a particular author uses a particular word. Each may have his own idiosyncrasy. I found that Symeon — again as I wrote in my book — often uses this verb to mean appointing people. I gave four examples (48.2, 53.6, 54.4, 88.2). I could have added more (34.6, 42.16, 42.19, 45.2, 45.4, 48.1). And he uses the related verb ἐφίστημι (ephistêmi) with this meaning, also (83.1). But I could not find a single example where it is supposed to mean creating an institution.

Returning to Waldron’s review, he is lukewarm about my tentative proposal to reinterpret the offending sentence (to mean Rome’s “equestrian order” rather than “units of cavalry”), although he concedes that “this is an intriguing idea that should be carefully considered”. Far from considering it, though, he immediately claims, by way of rebuttal, that “Symeon on three other occasions uses καθίστημι to mean ‘make’ or ‘establish as’ (42.17, 44.10, 49.2)”. I’m not convinced that “Gallienus was first to establish as cavalry units” is much of an improvement. The grammar still strikes me as odd.

But what about those three occasions cited by Waldron on which Symeon allegedly used the verb in a sense that would really help us here? Well, prepare for disappointment.

In the first one, Symeon describes how Nebuchadnezzar, the Babylonian king, invaded the Levant and “made all of Judaea subject to taxation”. Here he uses καθίστημι in the sense of “imposing” or “rendering” a particular state of affairs, qualified by the adjective ὑπόφορος (hypoforos, “liable to pay taxation”). In our sentence, Gallienus did not render a particular state of affairs on the cavalry units; he just “rendered” them — there’s no qualifying adjective!

Jumping to the third one, here Symeon uses the same construction to describe how Julius Caesar conquered parts of Germany, Gaul, and Britain, and “made 500 inhabited towns subject to Roman taxation”. Again, it is καθίστημι with the adjective ὑπόφορος and the same objection applies.

Waldron’s second reference is more interesting. Certainly, it is as irrelevant as the other two, but it brings us back to Jehu’s desecration of the precinct of Baal, quoted at the start. Here, perhaps uniquely in the Chronicon, Symeon uses καθίστημι not with an adjective but with a noun. The verb is, again, used in the sense of “rendering” or “bringing about” a particular state of affairs, but in this case, the subject of the sentence is the destroyed sanctuary of Baal, and it is being “rendered” as a λυτρών (lutrôn, “latrine”). Or as Hanway would have said, a jakes.

Final thoughts

Perhaps I was too hasty in excluding the meaning of setting up an institution. To be sure, Symeon doesn’t ever use the verb with this meaning. But I have found an instance of its use by Josephus referring to the Roman general Gabinius “setting up five councils” in Judaea (Jewish Antiquities 14.91). Could this apply to the creation of cavalry units?

Just to clarify, this is a grammatical argument only. I am still convinced that “Cedrenus’ confused remark” is either corrupt or mistaken, or both!

Fours and nines and Roman numerals

At primary school, I took the leading part in a play written by one of the teachers. It was a pastiche of the then-current and popular TV series Up Pompeii, of which I (being around 10 years of age) was entirely ignorant (it being rather risqué) — but the parents would definitely have appreciated the homage.

The show was titled Up Wumpeii, after the nearby housing estate built by developer George Wimpey Limited.

A few lines stick in my mind, across the gulf of fifty years. I opened the show, striding confidently down the aisle in the assembly hall, and as I headed for the stage, I intoned the immortal phrase, “Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears”, to which the chorus responded with “’ere, ’ere!”

At one point, a squad of ten Roman soldiers marched on and performed a gag about a roll call, which prompted a litany of baked products, including “baps, softies, MacKechnies” — a reference to the nearby bakery run by the firm of MacKechnie’s, where some of the parents may have been employed. The legionaries then proceeded to number off, Roman-style, to the amusement of the audience: “Aye, Aye-Aye, Aye-Aye-Aye, Aye-Vee, ...”, and so on, finishing with “Aye-Ecks, Ecks”.

How Roman numerals work

As school children the world over will tell you, the Romans did indeed form numbers by repeating symbols — thus, III (“Aye-Aye-Aye”) = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 — though, in practice, only the symbols I (one), X (ten), C (one hundred), and M (one thousand) could be repeated — not V (five), L (fifty), or D (five hundred).

Some numerals can be seen on this graffito from Pompeii (CIL IV, 5380), which is probably someone’s expenses, scratched on the wall.

Lines 1, 5, and 12 are consecutive dates in an unknown month: VIII Idus (“the eighth day before the Ides”) — the S has a flamboyant tail that trails diagonally down the wall to the next day’s entry: VII Idus. And there is a fine selection of numerals on display (presumably the cost of each item in asses, the smallest commonly available Roman coin).

Fours and nines

It is widely believed that, when writing numbers, rather than repeating a given symbol thrice (e.g. IIII), an alternative method was employed, whereby the symbol was placed to the left of the next-greater symbol. Since, in the case of I, the next greater symbol is V, rather than writing IIII, the alternative form IV was preferred. We can certainly see this on the graffito. In line 13 (third from bottom in the picture), the entry reads puero pane IV (“bread for the boy, 4”, presumably referring to a slave). (Notice that the character E is frequently represented in Roman handwriting by two vertical lines, so pane — also on lines 2, 6, and 12 — looks like PAN||.)

As with IIII and IV, rather than writing VIIII, the alternative “subtractive” form IX was preferred. Hence, the ninth Roman soldier in Up Wumpeii chanted “Aye-Ecks” (IX, geddit?). Unfortunately, the graffiti artist didn’t purchase anything that cost 9 asses, so we cannot say for sure that he would have used this form.

Convention or preference?

I was reminded of all this by a remark made in one of the reviews of my book The Fate of the Ninth (I don’t recall which one). The author had suggested that the Romans preferred to write the number 9 as VIIII, and not IX. This is definitely something crying out to be fact-checked.

It is easy to find monumental inscriptions with numerals. Every Roman emperor advertised how many times he had held the consulship, or had been acclaimed as imperator (“conquering general”), or — more importantly — had held the tribunicia potestas (“tribunician power”, which made the holder sacrosanct, and was thus fastidiously renewed every year).

On the left is Septimius Severus, who held the tribunician power for the ninth time in AD 201 (CIL VIII, 10992). He was reigning jointly with his elder son, Caracalla, who appears here as TR P IIII. (The numerals are highlighted in red.)

It is interesting that the “subtractive” method is used for 9, but the “additive” method for 4. This may have been down to the stonemason’s personal preference. It’s true that there wouldn’t really have been space to write TR P VIIII while keeping Severus’s titulature within the first two lines. But equally, the stonemason could have saved a little space on line 4 by writing TR P IV there.

Here is Septimius Severus again, in the same year, with the same co-regent. It’s even from the same site — Bu-Njem in Tripolitania! Each inscription sat above one of the fort gateways.

But this time, the stonemason has used the “additive” method for Severus’ tribunician power: TR POT VIIII. Was it simply down to choice?

I have a nagging suspicion that, where monumental inscriptions are concerned, the stonemason could use his own discretion to lay out a nicely balanced panel. Sometimes VIIII would work, and sometimes it had to be IX.

Official Roman documentation

But there is one genre that, we know, was governed by the imperial chancellery at Rome: namely, military diplomas. These were strictly legal documents, produced under the emperor’s auspices in Rome and conferring certain legal privileges upon the bearer. Their wording would have been carefully controlled. Can we see a pattern governing the representation of the number 9 here?

This is a diploma (CIL XVI, 95) issued by the emperor Antoninus Pius on 29 February AD 148 to the men “who served in my praetorium in the ten cohorts” — in other words, the Praetorian Guard.

In the list of ten numerals denoting the ten cohorts (the long list of numbers highlighted here), it can clearly be seen that the forms IV (for four) and IX (for nine) have been used.

Interestingly, on line 5, at the end of Antoninus Pius’ titulature, he is COS IIII (“having been consul four times”)! The scribe has used the “additive” method, although the “subtractive” method was used in the numbering of the Praetorian cohorts.

For comparison, here (below) is a section of a badly bent and twisted diploma, issued (again, to men of the ten Praetorian cohorts) by the emperors Valerian and Gallienus on 7 January AD 254 (CIL XVI, 155). It is, incidentally, one of the last known diplomas.

The ten cohorts are numbered on the third line, and it can clearly be seen that, by contrast with the Antonine scribe above, Valerian and Gallienus’ scribe has employed the “additive” method for both IIII and VIIII.

(It even seems that the scribe preparing the outer text of the diploma may often have had different ideas from the scribe responsible for the inner text, as RMD III, 185 shows.)

Method in the madness?

Perhaps a more detailed critique would uncover a hidden method, but it certainly looks as if VIIII and IX were used interchangeably throughout Roman imperial history. Neither one was preferred over the other.

The whole question arose, I suppose, in connection with my book The Fate of the Ninth, and the original comment was presumably based on the supposition that the Ninth Legion called itself legio VIIII Hispana, by preference. So, is this true? Can this be demonstrated?

Probably the most famous inscription of the Ninth Legion is the building slab that presumably graced one of the fortress gateways at York (RIB 665). (There’s a better image on p. 21 of my book.)

Here, on the bottom line, the legion calls itself LEG(io) VIIII HI[SP(ana).

It appears with the same style of numbering (but without Hispana) on the tombstone of Lucius Duccius the signifer (RIB 673, on p. 18 of my book), and also on the career inscription of Titus Aninius Sextius Florentinus (CIL III, 14148¹⁰), the memorial to Lucius Aemilius Karus (CIL VI, 1333), and the dedication to Lucius Novius Crispinus Martialis Saturninus at Lambaesis (CIL VIII, 2747). A couple of early tombstones also use this form.

By contrast, it appears as LEG(io) IX Hisp(ana) on the career inscription of Lucius Burbuleius Optatus Ligarianus (CIL X, 6006), the career inscription of Lucius Roscius Celer (CIL XIV, 3612), and one or two early tombstones.

Perhaps (it might be objected) those men chose their own way of representing the legion’s title. Surely the legion’s own gateway inscription should decide the issue?

However, we should be wary of such an argument, remembering the gateway inscriptions from Bu-Njem (above). I wonder — if we found the inscription from a different gateway of the York fortress, would the numeral necessarily take the same form?

Finally, we may consider the legion’s own tile-stamps, produced at their own tile-works. Shouldn’t they carry the official form of the legion’s numeral? The tile from Nijmegen (illustrated on p. 122 of my book) certainly reads LEG VIIII. But the tiles from northern England (two of them are illustrated here) use the “subtractive” method.

In any case, the Roman soldiers’ gag doesn’t seem quite so funny with “Vee-Aye-Aye-Aye, Vee-Aye-Aye-Aye-Aye, Ecks”.